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15. SUMMARY:

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(C) This report forwards the highlights of a conversation on 10 June 1971, with Dr. V. M. KULISH, head of the international relations portion of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). The conversation indicates Dr. KULISH's relationship with the so-called "Red Hawks" of the LENIN Military-Political Academy - Colonels RYBKIN, BONDARENKO and KRUPNOV, as well as the late Colonel GRUDININ. In view of Dr. KULISH's current work with SALT and Mutual Force Reductions in Europe, and the fact that he spent some six months in 1970 visiting in the United States, talking with leading personalities from Dr. KISSINGER to Senator JACKSON, his observations, even when somewhat cryptic, are of especial

COMMENT: (C) The attached report, "Dr. V. M. Kulish and the Soviet Military-Political Scene", will be of interest only to those, who have a basic understanding of Soviet military doctrine and strategy, and are familiar with the interpretations given to the writings of RYBKIN, PONDARENKO and GRUDININ by various Western Sovietologists such as Victor ZORZA, Roman KOLKOWICZ and Joe ALSOP. The belief by a number of Western writers that these Soviet colonels represent a protest group within the Soviet military has an impact upon United States perceptions of the Soviet Union. If it is considered that these officers are Party-approved military spokesmen, forecasts of Soviet weaponry may be altered. The fact that Dr. KULISH regards these officers as colleagues and friends should be given careful reflection.

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12 June 1971

DR. V. M. KULISH AND THE SOVIET MILITARY-POLITICAL SCENE

by H. Scott

Background

Dr. V. M. Kulish attended a reception at the British Embassy on 10 June 1971, in honor of the Queen's Birthday. During the course of the reception he and the Scotts talked for approximately one hour.

Dr. Kulish is one of the leading Soviet "defense-intellectuals". He is a retired colonel and during the early and mid-sixties was influential in the development of Soviet military strategy and doctrine. At the present time he is head of the international relations portion of The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). From approximately March to September 1970, he was in the United States, during which time he not that talked with an impressive number of key policy and decision-makers, such as Dr. Henry Kissinger, leading Senators and Congressmen and members of various universities and research institutes. The Scotts had met Dr. Kulish in Washington during this visit.

Current Interests

Shortly after arrival at the reception, the Scotts exchanged pleasantries with Dr. Kulish. At that time he stated he was working on matters associated with SALT and with mutual force reductions in Europe.

Association with the "Red Hawks" of the Lenin Military-Political Academy

Later in the evening Dr. Kulish came along to the area where the Scotts were talking with a group of attaches. He appeared to want to talk, but cid not want to break finto the group.

I lead the group and started a contactation with Kulish, stating that Colonel Scott and I had tried to go to the Lamin Military-Political Academy to hear Colonel S. I. Krupnov defend his Doctorate's dissertation on "A Logical Methodological Analysis of Military Science Mnowledge." (The announcement had been made in Red Star, which stated the dissertation could be on May 21st at 1400 hours). For some reason, we were not permitted to actuand.

Kellich said we should have gone through OVS (Soviet Foreign Tisison). The assumed him we had. We then discussed one of Krupnov's earlier erolely elected to the Laws of Melectic to dished in Red Stor, 7 January 1990. This article had been included in the book which Bill Kinther and I had written, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs. I said that

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Krupnov was a brilliart theoretician and his article had been one of the most original I had read. Dr. Kulish suggested we invite Krupnov to our home. "The first time he won't come, the second time he won't come, but the third time he will come", commented Kulish. (Kulish himself had been invited to the Scott's home in December, but he did not come. However, Sergo, Mikoyan, who works for him, did accept. In February, we deliberately omitted inviting IMEMO personnel to a reception, and instead had invited military personnel from the Institute of the USA. Col. V. V. Larionov, a rival of sorts of Kulish, did attend. Kulish may have meant himself in regard to invitations, as well as Krupnov.)


Col. Scott remarked that Krupnov had been the first to explain clearly how dialectics applied to military affairs, quoting him: "the appearance of new means of struggle always brings into being corresponding countermenas, which in the end also lead to changes in the methods of military operations. The 'struggle' of tanks and anti-tank means, airplanes and anti-airplanes defense, rockets and anti-rockets - this is the axis around which revolves the development in military affairs ..." This quotation startled Kulish. He asked if we really thought Soviet military thinking was good. He said he had met many people in the U.S. who had belittled Soviet theoreticians. I said it was because there were very few Soviet military writings in the United States which had been translated into English and, unfortunately, too few read Russian. I added that U.S. analysts paid too much attention to what the Soviet marshals wrote and hot enough attention to what was written by colonels. (Kulish is a colonel in the reserves.)

Kulish agreed with this statement, remarking that to understand what the marshals say you first must understand the basic theory. The colonels say it first.

Col. Scott said Colonel Grudinin's thinking was challenging, and even if one didn't agree with him, he obviously was a good thinker. His recent book, Dialectics and Contemporary Military Affairs, is contstanding. Kulish said that Grudinin had died suddenly, while doing exercises. In fact, Grudinin's wife had first called him to tell him her husband had just collapsed and died. He had not quite finished the book at the time and it was completed later by others.

Grudining was a Professor and a Doctornof Philosophical Sciences. Kulish said he was one of the first Soviet theoreticians to attempt to apply dialectics to military affairs. I mentioned Grudinin's book, Questions of Dialectics in Military Affairs, published in 1960. Kulish said at first it was thought impossible to relate dialectics and military affairs, but that Grudinin had shown the way.

I brought up Grudinin's well-known rebuke to another Soviet military theoretician, the famed Lt. Col. Rybkin. This had taken place in 1966, based on a lecture Rybkin had given entitled "Nuclear Rocket War and Politics".



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Kulish said Grudinin had shown him his article in draft and that he, Kulish, had advised against its publication.

(Rybkin had published an article "On the Nature of World Nuclear Rocket War", in Communist of the Armed Forces, September, 1965. This article was "recommended for officers, admirals and generals studying the theme 'nuclear rocket war and politics'", and hence was quite authoritative and not mere personal speculation, if such a thing exists in the controlled Soviet military press. Grudinin, and later others, started a small debate in the press as to whether war is a continuation of politics when it is nuclear. Gradinin, in his article, reiterates and approves of Rybkin's main points, especially of Rybkin's criticism of retired General N. Talensky, a "Pugwash General" and a well-known disarmament advocate. Grudinin's rebuke to Rybkin is so mild it is almost lost in the text, so much so that it appears he is using Rybkin's article to contradict some other faction. Later it become clear that the real target of both Rybkin and Grudinin was the Communist Chinese and their Maoist analysis of war.)

I mentioned General Zemskov's recent article in Red Star, 30 May 1971, "The Pentagon Adapts Its Strategy". (Zemskov is one of the outstanding Soviet analysts of U.S. military policy.) Kulish remarked that Zemskov was the editor of Military Thought, the classified Soviet military journal.

Kulish expressed mild surprise and celight at our comment on Soviet military thinking. I During this portion of the discussion he remarked time and again that these men were his colleagues and close personal friends. Ve asked him to tell them how their writings are read with our personal interest.

Col. Scott brought up Col. Bondarenko, another well-known writer at the Lenin Military-Political Academy. (Bondarenko, like Rybkin, is called by some U.S. analysts a "Red Hawk".) Kulish said Bondarenko is more a politician than a theoretician - but also his colleague and friend, like the others.

Views on Marshal Sokolovsky

Why, asked Kulish, the is not a theoretician, just a good tactician.
Sokolovsky did not write Military Strategy, said Kulish. Colonel Scott said that fact was recognized; Sokolovsky was just the aditor and there were some fourteen contributors. Kulish agreed, stating that Sokolovsky was just the proof", describing a roof with his hands.

Weste dn Comeral Gastilovich

Colonel Scott said that he thought General Gastilovich was quite a good theorestokan. Kulish thought a second and then said, yes, Gastilovich to brilliant. He them added that Capellovich was a real thinker and that he did a lot of work on Military Strategy. (GastiFovich, long a professor at

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the General Staff Academy, was particularly noted as the author of Chapter Seven of Military Strategy, the only contributor identified with a particular section of the book. Some U.S. analysts referred to Gastilovich as the 'modernist' contributor to Military Strategy. Brezhnev had been Gastilovich's political officer during at least a portion of World War II.)

Views on Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces Rotmistrov.

Kulish was asked about the perceptiveness of Marshal Rotmistrov. After thinking a minute, Kulish said he was a good tactician. "Of course, he is from the Armored Troops and not a general tactician." But he was a very good theoretician all the same, if one remembered his career.

Strategic Superiority

Colonel Scott remarked that the Soviets put more stress on military theory than do the defense-intellectuals in the United States. Kulish said that good strategy is impossible without good theory. Concerning strategy, he said it was not until he talked to Senator Jackson that he realized that Americans thought of superiority only in quantitative terms. (Dr. Fediay, SRI, had been with him at the interview). Kulish said Americans did not understand that strategic superiority was also qualitative and "superior strategy". Vietnam has shown that the U.S. does not have "superior strategy". But the U.S. does not equate this with strategic superiority. He stated: "The U.S. does not have superiority and hever did have superiority over the Soviets because you do not understand strategy."


When asked by Colonel Scott to identify some good non-Soviet strategists, Kulish mentioned only Beaufre of France, with whom he had spent many hours on a recent visit.

Dr. Kulish's New Book

I noted that June 22 would be the 30th Anniversary of the start of World War II, which the Soviets call The Great Patriotic War and not World War II. Kulish said it was World War II, and that he calls it that. He said his book on World War II is now at the publishers - quite thick, he indicated - and would appear later this year. The Soviet Union is not very fast at printing, he noted. (Kulish had done his Doctor's dissertation on the Second Front in Europe.) Col. Scott promised to send him an article that he had written concerning World War II.

Aspirations

Kulish said he was born on April 1 and since this was Bismarck's birthday also, he, Mulish, should have been a great diplomat. Colonel Scott said he was born on October 15, Eisenhower's birthday, and he guessed he should have been a great general by this reasoning. Kulish laughed and commented that neither of them had yet made it.



CONTINUE TO ALL

Final Observations

By this point it was after 1930 hours and most guests had departed. A British Assistant Attache came up and this broke up our conversation. After exchanging a few polite words, Kulish said he must go. Upon leaving, he asked if we had seen the movie, "Belorussian Station". We said no. He said to see it and next time we met we could discuss it. I asked if this was part of the 3-part series, "Liberation", "On the Main Front", etc. No, Kulish said, they were not as good as this one. We said we would meet at the U.S. Embassy on the July 4th Reception.

During most of the conversation a thin man in a grey suit stood for some time about 20 feet behind Kulish, at the edge of a flower bed. As is usual, the Soviets ensure that KGB attend receptions where Soviets mix with foreigners By his scowl, it would seem he did not like the lengthy conversation.

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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Wednesday - 16 June 1971

25X1	1. GLC) At lunch today Bill Woodruff, Counsel, Senate
	Appropriations Committee, told me of a suggestion he had made to Jim Frey,
	OMB, for a possible method of interim funding of the Radios by the addition
	of appropriate language in the continuing resolution (see Memorandum for
	the Record).
	He also alerted me to a budgetary problem concerning a sensitive
	DDS&T project (see Memorandum for the Record).
	I briefed Woodruff on the following: recent information on a possible
	ChiCom nuclear powered submarine, Soviet use of an airborne strategic
	command post, the difficulty encountered by Soyuz 11, Soviet exercise in
	southwestern Russia, and the presence of Soviet oceanographic ships in the
	Gulf of Mexico.
25X1	2. GLC) In response to a note from Frank Hand, DOD, yesterday evening on the possibility of the Badillo bill (H. R. 8371) being attached to the Defense procurement authorization as an amendment, I told Hand that the House Armed Services Committee had requested our views on this bill, but asked that we not treat this as a priority item. I added that I thought Frank Slatinshek and Russ Blandford, of the Committee staff, were quite familiar with the impact which such legislation would have. Hand said he was sure this would cover the matter which General Lawrence had raised on this.
25X1	3 JGO) Met with Mr. James Wilson, House Science and
	Astronautics Committee, and briefed him on the Course Il/Salast mission

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Page 4

Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Wednesday - 16 June 1971

25X1	12. (JMM) Margaret Young, in the office of Representative Bob Wilson, called to say that Wilson had two people in his office on an important matter and would like me to see them. It was agreed I would meet them, of STATOTHR the Skyline Inn tomorrow at 11:00 a.m.
25X1	JMM) Talked to Ralph Preston, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations Committee, and asked him to investigate some technical problems about handling the Radios under a continuing resolution—particularly whether they could be operated under a continuing resolution in FY 1972 by an agency other than the one which operated them in FY 1971 (i.e., whether, under a continuing resolution, they could be operated by USIA). He said he would look into it.
25X1	14
	/ Legislative Counsel
	cc: ER O/DDCI Mr
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